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THE BUSINESS OF THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Karl Manheim *
Review by the Supreme Court... will be ordered.., where it
appears necessary to secure uniformity of decision or the settle-
ment of important questions of law .... 1
Given the considerable limitations upon the court's time and
resources.., and taking into account the burden of automatic
appeals in death penalty cases and state bar disciplinary mat-
ters, the option to grant is not one that ought to be, or indeed
can be, exercised lightly.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The functions of appellate review are many: to correct error, to se-
cure uniformity of decision, to develop common law, to supervise the
administration of justice and others.3 If a single overarching principle
were used to describe these functions, it would likely be: "promoting the
rule of law." This is especially true of the several high courts in the
federal and state systems. It has become customary to expect these
supreme courts to hear and decide the important legal and social issues
of the day.4 Although litigants may look to supreme courts for individ-
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. CAL. R. CT. 29(a).
2. Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72
CAL. L. REv. 514, 519 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
3. DANIEL J. MEADOR, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, APPELLATE COURTS:
STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 2-3 (1974). Judge Shirley Hufstedler has
described the functions of appellate review as principally the "review for correctness" and the
"institutional function[ ]." Shirley M. Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping
the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 901, 910 (1971). It is the latter function that guides
and develops the body of law within the American legal system. See Charles W. Joiner, The
Function of the Appellate System, in JUSTICE IN THE STATES 97, 102 (William F. Swindler ed.,
1971).
4. Intermediate appellate courts also have the opportunity to articulate legal doctrine, as
in cases of "first impression." However, to the extent a decision is truly novel or advances
doctrine, it is likely to be reviewed by the highest court of the jurisdiction. In California,
therefore, "the Court of Appeal does not fully share the policy-articulation domain of the
Supreme Court.... [It] primarily engages in the particularistic review of trial court disposi-
tions." THOMAS Y. DAVIES III, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF
CASE OUTCOMES IN A CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL 112-13 (1980).
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ual relief, the profession and the community at large depend upon them
for guidance, legal reform and perhaps most importantly, predictability.'
Business, government and individuals all develop expectations of legal
results based on high court decisions of a particular time.'
Quite apart from the substance of legal rules, the existence of dis-
cernable doctrine is critical. Unless the rules and their certainty are
known, it may be difficult to formulate behavior.7 In a society like ours
in which law is an integral component of commercial, political and per-
sonal transactions, the absence or uncertainty of law retards progress8
and the protection of individual rights.9
The legislature is the primary law maker in our legal culture. Yet,
because of the law's breadth and complexity, courts have the task of in-
terpreting positive law, filling in its interstices, and adapting it to social
developments."° We rely heavily on judge-made or "common law" to
supply the substantive rules of the community. This is a function of our
5. According to Justice Holmes, law is merely a prediction of what courts will do. See
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
6. Indeed, eras of legal development are named after the personalities who populate the
nation's high courts such as the "Warren era," the "Bird court" and so forth.
7. See WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS § 4.5(d), at 54 (2d ed. 1991).
[S]tability in expectations must be considered as an extremely important end in itself.
Stability reduces uncertainty and thus helps all those who come in contact with deci-
sional law.., to plan their activities with a minimum of risk. Thus, stability is a very
important end for the adjudicative process to seek.
Id at 56.
8. Id. at 164-65 ("Whenever the law is uncertain, risk increases in a transaction and the
cost of that transaction increases.").
9. One area where this has occurred is in the development of state constitutional law,
where the California Supreme Court was once in the vanguard. Recently, it has fallen behind
other state courts in using their own constitutions to develop doctrine independent of that
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. See generally JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS & DEFENSES (1992) (discussing
growing role of state courts in revitalizing state constitutional rights). The California Supreme
Court's caseload simply does not give it the opportunity to address many of the emerging
issues found in the state's constitution. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Con-
stitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 800 (1992). Another factor is that the court may be
philosophically opposed to developing substantive law under the state constitution, preferring
instead to rely on the U.S. Supreme Court's articulation of federal standards. See, e.g., Sands
v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 903, 809 P.2d 809, 834, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 59
(1991) (Lucas, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing that while decisions are "not binding on ques-
tions of state constitutional law... such decisions will not be departed from in the absence of
cogent and persuasive reasons"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992).
10. The term "positive law" denotes law passed by legislative authority in a constitution,
in a statute, by an initiative or through an executive regulation. In contrast, "common law"
refers to law made by judges, either in interpreting positive law or in creating their own juridi-
cal rules.
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appellate courts-principally the highest or supreme court of a
jurisdiction.11
What happens when a supreme court becomes overloaded, slows
down or otherwise leaves important legal issues unresolved? For one
thing, it leaves a vacuum in the law, making the jobs of lower courts and
lawyers more difficult to perform. 12 Frustration of the bar and lower
bench may ultimately result in social malaise and business hesitation.13
At the extreme, it may contribute to withdrawal from the judicial pro-
cess,14 or worse yet, a general sense that government is not working-a
breach of the social contract. 5 The point may be overstated, but only to
illustrate the degree of dependency we have on the work of supreme
11. Intermediate appellate courts rarely make law, recognizing that as the domain of the
supreme court. See DAVIES, supra note 4, at 135 ("Law articulation in the Courts of Appeal is
significantly more restrained than in the Supreme Court.").
12. In this regard, see the opinion of Lord Halsbury in London Streets Tramways Co. v.
London County Council, 1898 P. 375 (Eng. C.A.), referring to "the disastrous inconven-
ience-of having each question subject to being reargued and the dealings of mankind ren-
dered doubtful by reason of different decisions, so that in truth and in fact there would be no
real final Court of Appeal." IL at 380.
Retired Court of Appeal Justice Thompson describes the problem as it affects capital
cases: "[T]rial courts, unguided by a decision of the high court, proceeded as they had before
on undecided questions. Cases decided in these courts became candidates for reversal on
grounds unknowable by the trial judge. Reversal after reversal became the pattern." Robert S.
Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the Califor-
nia Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2007, 2035 (1988).
13. See, eg., Philip Hager, 'Unsexy' Cases Passed Over by Strapped High Court, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, at A3. One commentator has stated:
ETihe collective impact of the court's inability to decide a wide-range of issues is
causing growing concern in the legal community....
Legal experts say the resulting delay in resolving civil issues is causing increas-
ing confusion and uncertainty in the lower courts-as judges, lawyers and litigants
lack the firm and clear judicial precedents they need from the state's highest court.
Iad
14. Harry N. Scheiber, Changes in the California Courts Since the 1960s: A Historical
Perspective (unpublished manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
One loss is certainly the diminishing judicial articulation of public values. Another
might easily be a long-term trend toward withdrawal from the system-that is, an
increasing reliance on alternatives to courts or upon court-annexed processes-by
wealthier litigants seeking to avoid delay; this may result in a loss of interest on the
part of influential citizens in the question of public support for the courts' fiscal needs
Id. at 34.
15. Public confidence in the American judicial system, as measured by opinion polls, ap-
pears very low. A nationwide survey conducted for the National Center for State Courts
found:
Of 15 major American institutions rated by respondents in this national survey, state
and local courts ranked near the bottom in public confidence .... More than a third
of the respondents indicated little or no confidence in the courts .... [T]he data
revealed that the more experience people had with the courts--as litigants, witnesses,
or jurors-the less confidence they expressed in the judicial system.
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courts. 16 The supreme courts' significant departure from their tradi-
tional function is problematic at many levels of society.
To the consumers of judicial services-lawyers and litigants-speed,
efficiency and dependability in the delivery of service may be as valuable
as the goods themselves. Thus, even where the "quality of [justice] is
not strained" 7 in terms of substantive result, inaccessible courts can
inhibit the overall regime of law. We are far from the point of break-
down, for example, in the way often attributed to the legal system in
India."8 Still, virtually every segment of the community has criticized
California's judicial system and its inherent delays.19 Lawyers have
Thomas W. Church, The Mansion vs. The Gatehouse: Viewing the Courts from a Consumer's
Perspective, 75 JUDICATURE 255, 256 (1992).
The picture may not be quite so bleak in California. According to a recent survey taken
for the Judicial Council of California, Californians were nearly split on their opinions of the
state court system. Almost half of the Californians surveyed said the court system is "good,"
"very good" or "excellent," while 52% had an "only fair" or "poor" opinion on a five-point
scale ranging from excellent to poor. YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE/CLANCY SHULMAN,
2020 VISION: THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE COURTS, SURVEYING THE Fu-
TURE: CALIFORNIANS' ATTITUDES ON THE COURT SYSTEM 5 (1992) [hereinafter 2020
VISION].
16. There is abundant literature and a growing jurisprudence on the work and function of
appellate courts. It is not the purpose of this Article to explore the issue beyond an empirical
review of the workload of the California Supreme Court.
17. With apologies to Portia, who explained to Shylock: "The quality of mercy is not
strain'd." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 86 (A.D. Richardson III
ed., rev. ed. 1960). Portia added:
Though justice be thy plea, consider this,
That in the course of justice, none of us
Should see salvation. We do pray for mercy ....
Id
18. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 848-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing sources of delays in Indian legal system); see, e.g., L. Babu Ram v.
Sri Raghunathji Maharaj, 1976 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1734, 1735 (1976) (case in litigation for 25 years).
For an overview of the problems of the Indian court system, see Rajeev Dhavan, For Whom?
And For What? Reflections on the Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 295, 298-99
(1985) (explaining that poor are victims of Indian legal system, due to endemic delays and
underdeveloped tort law), and Marc Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in
India After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 273 (1985) (arguing that condition of
Indian legal system would make it difficult for India to handle Bhopal litigation).
19. As Bernard E. Witkin stated a decade ago:
I am not alone in saying that the legal system has been in jeopardy for 50 years. The
system has grown far too cumbersome, and the laws and procedures are far too com-
plex. The methods of getting justice are delayed too long.
What we need is a rational re-examination and overhauling of a system that has
grown up without adequate continual appraisal.
... [Where we fall down is in the operation of the ourts.... No one who
understands the system can say that it is operating in an efficient manner.
B.E. Witkin: 'Our Legal System Is in Jeopardy', CAL. LAW., Sept. 1982, at 82, 83 [hereinafter
Witkin] (question and answer interview with Witkin conducted by Diana Diamond and
Jonathan Maslow).
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complained.20 Legislatures have held hearings.21 Jurists have decried
the "crisis in the courts," 22 even to the point of using their opinions to
promote reform.23
The stark reality of clogged courts and endemic delay stands in con-
trast to idealistic visions of American justice. Confidence in our legal
system depends on the efficient administration of justice.24 Yet, when it
20. Titles in professional journals reveal anger and alarm within the profession. See id at
82; Joseph McNamara, Chaos in the Criminal Courts, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1981, at 7, 7 ("Even
those lawyers and judges who react angrily to criticism of the legal process concede that the
court system is on the verge of chaos. The courts have become incredibly slow, expensive and
inefficient."). These are matched by articles in the popular press. See, e.g., Michele Kort,
Fairly Unpredictable: On the Lackluster California Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES MAG., Feb. 7,
1993, at 31.
Of course these commentaries are nothing new. For instance, the 1932 California State
Bar Journal included the following articles: Fred E. Borton, The Breaking Down of Our Judi-
cial System, 7 STATE B.J. 7 (1932); Peter J. Crosby, A Message from the President Concerning
Appellate Court Congestion, 7 STATE B.J. 10 (1932); F.H. Dam, California's Appellate Prob-
lem, 7 STATE B.J. 11 (1932); Evan Haynes, Congestion in the Appellate Courts of California, 7
STATE B.J. 3 (1932); and, John W. Preston, Proposed Legislation to Relieve Appellate Court
Congestion, 7 STATE B.J. 17 (1932).
21. See, e.g., CAL. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY AND CRIM. JUSTICE COMMS., COURT OF AP-
PEAL EFFICIENCY 76-86 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Marcus Kaufman, Crisis in the Courts, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1990, at 28.
23. See Justice Hanson's concurring opinion in Gonzalez v. Superior Court, in which he
felt "compelled to speak out on the subject of court reform." 140 Cal. App. 3d 146, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 696, 709 (1983) (Hanson, J., concurring), vacated, 154 Cal. App. 3d 583, 201 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1984) (depublished, July 12, 1984).
[Ilt is absolutely essential that California's appellate justices assume a leadership role
and speak out and beat the drums for court reform not only on every "soapbox"
available but also follow the lead of Chief Justice Burger and speak out in their writ-
ten opinions. In California the need for appellate justices to speak out in their pub-
lished opinions toward court reform in order to generate a dialogue directed at
improving the administration of justice is clearly recognized by providing that one of
the criteria for publication of appellate opinions is criticism of existing rules, with
reasons for such criticism.
Id, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (Hanson, J., concurring) (depublished, July 12, 1984).
In denying the petition for hearing in Gonzalez, the supreme court "ordered that the
opinion be not officially published." 154 Cal. App. 3d 583, 201 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1984); see CAL.
R. CT. 976(c)(2) (depublication by order of supreme court). A depublication order means that
the case "shall not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action or proceed-
ing." Id 977(a); see infra note 87. The Rules of Court, however, do not and could not pro-
hibit citation of unpublished opinions in law review articles or other nonjudicial forums. See
generally George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39
MERCER L. REv. 477 (1988) (exploring extent to which unpublished opinions serve to settle
case before court and to establish law used to decide other cases).
24. This was a major theme of former Chief Justice Warren Burger, who urged court
reform to restore public confidence in the American judicial system. For instance, in his 1982
Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary before the American Bar Association (in Chicago
on January 24, 1982), the Chief Justice stated: "'To fulfill our traditional obligation means
that we should provide mechanisms that can produce an acceptable result in the shortest possi-
ble time, with the least possible expense, and with a minimum of stress on the participants.
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takes four or more years to bring a case to trial in the superior court,25
and years more for appellate review,26 the maxim "justice delayed is jus-
tice denied,"'27 assumes tangible meaning. Former Justice Marcus Kauf-
man thus echoes a familiar refrain when he says that "the most serious
problem facing the California justice system is overload. '2  "Caseload
stress" exacts a high price on the legal system.
The California Supreme Court has long endured criticism of this
nature. Virtually from its inception, the court has struggled with means
to increase productivity and reduce delay. The current era is no differ-
ent. The complexion of the supreme court's docket has changed, partly
in response to obligations imposed on it by law. One result is that the
number of civil cases heard has declined, corresponding to an increase in
capital cases and, until recently, attorney discipline matters. By some
measures, the number of hearings granted and decisions ified are near
their historic lows. 29 While at the same time, the number of court of
appeal decisions ordered depublished by the supreme court has reached a
record high. 0 The net result is less law, or at least relatively fewer pub-
lished decisions from which doctrine can be ascertained.3
The consequences of such trends, if true, are beyond the scope of
this Article. I leave it to others to draw their own conclusions. Perhaps
to the anarchists among us, less law is better, returning us-even if infini-
tesimally so-to a state of nature unbound by legal rules.32 In contrast,
That is what justice is all about.'" Gonzalez, 140 Cal. App. 3d 146, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 709
(Hanson, J., concurring) (depublished, July 12, 1984) (quoting Chief Justice Warren E. Bur-
ger, Report Before the American Bar Association (1982)).
25. See Witkin, supra note 19, at 83. "When it takes four years to get to trial in a civil
case, something is radically wrong. When it takes two weeks to pick a jury in a prominent
criminal case, somebody must be nuts. And endless post-conviction review in criminal cases
also seems very wrong." Id
26. "On the Court of Appeal level, civil case litigants and counsel have experienced the
aggravation and frustration of carrying the burden of uncertainty from median time of 12 to 29
months, statewide, awaiting decision from the time of filing notice of appeal." Gonzalez, 140
Cal. App. 3d 146, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (Hanson, J., concurring) (depublished, July 12, 1984).
27. The phrase was coined by William Gladstone, Prime Minister of Great Britain in the
19th century.
28. Kaufman, supra note 22, at 28.
29. See infra notes 133-44.
30. Gerald F. Uelmen, Dean of Santa Clara University School of Law, recently reported
that the number of lower court opinions depublished by the supreme court exceeded the
number of its own published decisions. Gerald F. Uelmen, The Disappearing Dissenters, CAL.
LAW., June 1991, at 35, 39; see infra notes 92-93.
31. See MEADOR, supra note 3, at vii ("[A]ggravated delay has persisted, and the larger
the appellate system, the more likely the deterioration of doctrinal consistency."); Thompson,
supra note 12, at 2051.
32. Although returning us toferae naturae is hardly the California Supreme Court's objec-
tive, the court has managed to eliminate entire categories of claims from judicial oversight.
[Vol. 26:1085
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many believe that the inability to predict legal outcomes invites disaster.
For instance, a slowdown in the courts drives dispute resolution under-
ground, where substantive and procedural rules are shielded from the
light of public and juridic scrutiny.
33
But, that is not the point of this Article. Nor does this Article set
some normative standard by which the performance of the California
Supreme Court or other courts can be measured. Rather, this Article is
merely descriptive. It examines the caseload of our state's supreme court
over the past two decades and compares certain aspects of the court's
docket to that of high courts in other states.
In this manner, some observations can be made about the business
of the California Supreme Court. First, and of little surprise to court-
watchers, the supreme court spends an increasing amount of its time on
death penalty cases.34 The percentage of its docket devoted to capital
cases is also high compared to supreme courts in other states.35 Second,
a petitioner's chance of having review granted by the supreme court is
now about five percent, half of what it was a decade ago, and one-fifth of
what it was forty years ago.36 Perhaps as a consequence of this, the
number of appellate decisions in which review is sought in the supreme
court is on a steady decline.37 Third, the number of cases that the
supreme court disposes of without written opinion is rapidly increasing.38
Fourth, the number of cases the supreme court orders depublished is in-
creasing.39 Particularly in the civil area, these developments add up to
fewer law-settling decisions by our supreme court.
But it would be a mistake to accuse the court either of shirking its
responsibilities or of inefficiency. Indeed, the total amount of business
transacted by the court is impressive.' The problem may simply be that
the nation's most populous state, and the world's sixth largest econ-
omy,41 transacts a lot of legal business and simply needs more appellate
Kaufman, supra note 22, at 30 (describing seven classes of cases either eliminated or restricted
in judicial access by supreme court).
33. Id. at 29 ("[E]limination of such cases from the court system will only result in their
resolution in nonjudicial tribunals where the rights of litigants are greatly attenuated.").
34. See infra part IV.
35. See infra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
36. See infra p. 1110, Chart 4. In 1951 the court granted 25% of all petitions for hearing.
DAVIES, supra note 4, at 120.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 140-41.
38. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 92-93.
40. See infra note 144.
41. See The Squeeze on the Middle Class Is a Chokehold on the State, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
30, 1991, at B4.
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justices than can be afforded during an era of diminishing resources.42 It
may be that the court does a remarkable job given the constraints and, at
times, even the outright hostility from the legislature and other sectors.
Or perhaps the court should refocus its priorities to recapture the lustre
that once shone on the California Supreme Court. In any event, this
Article presents data for further discussion and debate.
II. A HISTORY OF DELAY
Court delay and clogged dockets are not new to California courts.
Complaints of a "crisis in the courts" have been common throughout the
twentieth century.43 Indeed, congestion has been nearly endemic since
the days of the California Republic in the 1840s. The periodic pleas for
reform since then fill many volumes, but changes have not shown much
success.
44
At the supreme court, delays were recorded from the very begin-
ning. Under the Constitution of 1849, the supreme court was the state's
only appellate court,4" and it had only three justices. 6 Because of rapid
turnover in the early years, there were often "only two justices available
42. This is a real problem, at least insofar as the supreme court's budget is concerned.
While some have suggested that increased judicial budgets could help unclog the appellate
system, see infra note 234, the California Legislature seems intent on reducing it. Shortly after
the supreme court upheld Proposition 140, which imposed term limits and a 38% budget cut
on the legislature, an Assembly committee recommended a retaliatory 38% reduction in the
court's budget. Bill Ainsworth, Judiciary Not Spared From the Budgetary Ax, RECORDER,
Apr. 8, 1992, at 1. A Senate committee reduced the cut to 21.5%, id., and ultimately it was
cut by only 2.5%. Monica Bay, Blowing Up at the Bar, RECORDER, Oct. 6, 1992, at 1. None-
theless, the legislature seems poised to use the court's budget as a weapon to influence out-
comes. Outrageous perhaps, but not as extreme as cancelling court sessions, cf Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), or eliminating jurisdiction, see Ex Parte McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), to affect pending cases.
43. See DAviES, supra note 4, at 325 (describing dire warnings of caseload growth in
1920s and 1930s); Scheiber, supra note 14, at 3. Scheiber explains "court congestion should be
seen not as unprecedented phenomena of our own day, but rather as recurring problems." Id.
44. Scheiber, supra note 14, at 4.
The bench and bar and legislative bodies have been producing inventories of
proposed changes for decades. Most have proven nearly impossible to implement
because of the conflicting objectives of participants in the processes of adjudication
and because of the continued escalation of tensions between the separate branches of
government dating back to Marbury vs Madison.
TASK FORCE ON COURTS, L.A. CoUNTY ECONOMY AND EFFCIENCY COMM'N, REPORT ON
THE COURT SYSTEM, Los ANGELES CouNTY at iv (1981).
45. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. VI, § 4. The supreme court had sole appellate jurisdiction
except in cases decided by justices of the peace, in which original appellate jurisdiction lay with
the county courts. Id. § 9.
46. Id. § 2.
[Vol. 26:1085
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to hear cases, and if they disagreed, no decision could be rendered."'47 At
some points, the court could not muster a quorum.48 Responding to the
problem, the California Legislature authorized the use of temporary or
interim justices to "aid the work of the Court,"'4 but the effort proved
unsuccessful.5" Eventually, the constitution was amended in 1862 to ex-
pand the court to five members.
51
Nonetheless, delay persisted. By 1879, the justices had fallen behind
on their calendars and were unable to issue written opinions in nearly
half of their cases.52 By 1882, the average wait for decisions in pending
cases was two years. 53 In an attempt to reduce this delay, the court dis-
pensed with oral arguments and decided cases based on the briefs that
were submitted.54 The legislature once again sought to provide addi-
tional personnel to assist the court. It authorized the appointment of
47. ARNOLD ROTH, THE CALIFORNIA STATE SUPREME COURT: A LEGAL HISTORY
1860-1879, at 8 (1973). In its first seven years, eight justices retired from the court. Id. "This
constituted a rapid turnover because no more than three justices sat at any one time....
[W]ith this turnover reversals of decisions were likely, and little could be done toward estab-
lishing a system of precedents." Id.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id. at 9.
50. The court declared the authorization to be unconstitutional because there were no
vacancies to be filled. Id at 9-10. This problem was cured by a 1926 constitutional amend-
ment that authorized the chief justice to "provide for the assignment of any judge to another
court of a like or higher jurisdiction to assist a court or judge whose calendar is congested."
CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. VI, § la (1926). Temporary assignments began the next year. DA-
VIES, supra note 4, at 325.
The current provision is found in article VI, § 6, which states:
The Chief Justice shall seek to expedite judicial business and to equalize the work of
judges. The Chief Justice may provide for the assignment of any judge to another
court but only with the judge's consent if the court is of lower jurisdiction. A retired
judge who consents may be assigned to any court.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6. Section 170.8 of the California Code of Civil Procedure also pro-
vides that the chairman of the judicial council (chief justice) may assign a judge to hear an
action or proceeding in a court if there is no qualified judge in that court to hear the action or
proceeding. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.8 (West Supp. 1993).
It is now common for the chief justice to fill temporary vacancies on the supreme court by
appointing lower court judges to sit by designation. See, eg., Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.
3d 474, 481, 601 P.2d 1030, 1035, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (1979).
51. The 1862 constitutional amendment also provided for direct election of supreme court
justices by the voters. This replaced the scheme of legislative appointments provided in article
VI of the 1849 constitution. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. VI, § 3 (1862).
52. See Randall D. Sosnick, Comment, The California Supreme Court and Selective Re-
view, 72 CAL. L. REV. 720, 725 (1984).
53. SUPREME COURT OF CAL., SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA PRACTICES AND PRO-
CEDURES 8 (1990). The court consisted of seven members then, as it does now. But no inter-
mediate appellate courts existed. Id. at 8-9.
54. Id. at 8.
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commissioners to help dispose of backlogged cases. 5  Apparently, this
plan fared little or no better than the earlier one. The five appointed
commissioners "did not sufficiently alleviate the court's workload.
''5 6
A constitutional amendment in 1879 expanded the supreme court to
seven members and authorized a division of the court into two depart-
ments.17 Still, delay persisted. Initial attempts to create intermediate ap-
pellate courts to relieve congestion at the supreme court level were
unsuccessful.5" Finally, in 1904, the legislature approved a constitutional
amendment to create the district courts of appeal.5 9 These courts were to
handle appeals in the "'ordinary current of cases,"' leaving the "'great
and important' cases" to the supreme court." Not only did this amend-
ment allow the court of appeal to relieve the supreme court of the burden
of ordinary appeals, 6' it also made the court of appeal the repository for
most writs and other original filings.62 The creation of the court of ap-
peal permitted the supreme court "to concentrate its efforts on the articu-
lation of legal policy.
63
55. Id
56. Id
57. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. VI, § 2; see Sosnick, supra note 52, at 725 nn.34-37.
58. Sosnick, supra note 52, at 726-27. The 1879 convention rejected a proposal to estab-
lish a court of appeal "because of the unsatisfactory results obtained with the New York Court
of Appeals, which had at that time become 'a sort of receptacle for worn out old Judges,' and
was often in conflict with the state supreme court." Id at 725 n.32 (quoting 3 E.B. WILLIS &
P.K. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1455 (1881) (remarks of Mr. Wilson)). Voters defeated a similar
proposal at the polls in 1900. Id at 726 n.38.
59. Act of Mar. 14, 1903, ch. 38, 1903 Cal. Stat. 737 (amending scattered sections of CAL.
CONST. art. VI).
60. William W. Blume, California Courts in Historical Perspective, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 121,
173-74 (1970) (quoting 2 E.B. WILLIS & P.K. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 951 (1880) (remarks of
chairman of judiciary committee)); see also People v. Davis, 147 Cal. 346, 349, 81 P. 718, 720
(1905).
At the time this constitutional amendment was put forward and adopted this court
had been for years unable to dispose of the business before it as fast as it accumu-
lated, and the cases were decided from two to three years after the appeals were
filed.... The amendment was adopted chiefly for the purpose of affording a remedy
for this evil.
Ia
61. The court of appeal's appellate jurisdiction extended to civil actions up to $2000 in
controversy and noncapital criminal cases. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (repealed 1966). In addi-
tion, the supreme court could transfer cases from its docket to the court of appeal. Id.
"Within a short time after the creation of the Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court was trans-
ferring a substantial proportion of the cases in its own jurisdiction down to the District Courts
of Appeal." DAVIES, supra note 4, at 117.
62. DAVIES, supra note 4, at 117.
63. Id at 118.
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There were few other significant changes in court structure during
the first half of the twentieth century. The Judicial Council was created
in 1926 "[t]o improve the administration of justice" and "to expedite
judicial business."" It has taken a leading role in California judicial re-
form and has promoted efficiency, competence and public confidence in
the courts. 5 In the 1940s, Chief Justice Gibson professionalized the sup-
porting staff of the supreme court.6 6 "[L]aw clerks were supplemented
by career staff attorneys whose task it was to aid the justices."'67
The jurisdiction of the court of appeal was expanded in 1966 to in-
clude virtually all appeals except capital cases, attorney discipline actions
and the review of Public Utility Commission orders.6" Constitutional
amendment of 1984 further attempted to reduce the supreme court's
workload.69 Proposition 32 instituted selective review, allowing the
supreme court to review "all or part of a decision."70 Under the prior
rule, granting a petition for hearing had the result of vacating the deci-
sion below, thus necessitating supreme court review of a case in its en-
tirety.71 A grant of review would result in the lower court opinion being
vacated, because it was a "nullity."72 Under the current practice of selec-
tive review, the appeal is "confined to the specified issues and issues fairly
64. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
65. Scheiber, supra note 14, at 37-77.
66. Thompson, supra note 12, at 2012.
67. Id.
68. DAVIES, supra note 4, at 117.
69. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(c) (enacting Proposition 32 (1984)).
70. Id. As explained in the Advisory Committee comment to California Rule of Court
29.2:
If the Supreme Court decides only limited issues, other issues in the cause will be
disposed of by the Court of Appeal as the Supreme Court directs. If the Court of
Appeal is not directed to take further action, the original Court of Appeal resolution
of the other issues stands as between the parties.
CAL. R. CT. 29.2 advisory committee's cmt. (West Supp. 1993).
71. Sosnick, supra note 52, at 720.
72. See Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937), in which the court stated:
The opinion and decision of the District Court of Appeal, by our order of transfer,
have become a nullity and are of no force or effect, either as a judgment or as an
authoritative statement of any principle of law therein discussed.... [T]he opinion
may serve as a brief on the legal questions involved therein, and may be adopted by
this court as its opinion in the pending action. But without some further express act
of approval or adoption of said opinion by this court, that opinion and decision are of
no more effect as a judgment or as a precedent to be followed in the decision of legal
questions that may hereafter arise than if they had not been written.
Id. at 483-84, 66 P.2d at 438-39 (citation omitted).
The rule requiring vacation of court of appeal decisions contrasts with the practice in the
federal judiciary. Each federal circuit has its own practice regarding publishing opinions, see,
e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, and there is no provision for vacating or depublishing opinions. But see
Arthur D. Hellman, "Granted, Vacated, and Remanded"--Shedding Light on a Dark Corner
of Supreme Court Practice, 67 JUDICATURE 389 (1984) (discussing effect of United States
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included" in the order granting review.7" The 1984 amendment was
"[d]esigned to help the court run more efficiently" and to provide "the
justices more time to focus on the most important issues." 74
In addition to the constitutional changes noted here, the supreme
court has implemented internal policies designed to speed up the deci-
sion-making process. These include measures to increase office efficiency
and reliance on the court's central staff.75 This corresponds to similar
reform movements across the country.76 However, such policies deem-
phasize the role of the judge in appellate decision making77 and result in
Supreme Court's summary orders vacating judgment below and remanding for further consid-
eration).
The former California rule also had the unintentional effect of dissuading lower courts
from writing comprehensive opinions. See, eg., In re Mitchell P., 74 Cal. App. 3d 420, 141
Cal. Rptr. 504 (1977), vacated, 22 Cal. 3d 946, 587 P.2d 1144, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 845 (1979). The court in Mitchell P. stated:
It appears inevitable that the Supreme Court will grant a hearing in this case to
secure uniformity of decision. Therefore, since this opinion will be short-lived and
our deathless prose promptly lost to posterity, we will attempt to be brief-a mere
statement that we disagree with the decisions in the other cases and a brief explana-
tion of our reasons for so holding.
Id
73. CAL. R. CT. 29.2(b).
74. SUPREME COURT OF CAL., supra note 53, at 10. Selective review was also intended to
reduce the need for the supreme court to depublish court of appeal decisions as an alternative
to granting review. Grodin, supra note 2, at 528. It apparently has not had this salutary effect.
See supra note 30.
75. SUPREME COURT OF CAL., supra note 53, at 10. For instance, the central staff now
prepares "conference memos" on filed cases, recommending that a hearing be granted or de-
nied. Id at 30. At least in civil cases, conference memos were once written by individual
justices or their clerks. Stephen R. Barnett, The Death of Oral Argument, CAL. LAw., June
1990, at 45, 45-46. "Central staff answer to the chiefjudge and to the court as a whole, rather
than to an individual judge." REYNOLDS, supra note 7, § 3.11, at 46.
76. See REYNOLDS, supra note 7, § 3.11, at 45 ("There has been a marked increase in
'pam-judicial' staff in recent decades.... Most appellate courts now also have a central staff,
some of which are quite large."); see also MEADOR, supra note 3, at 12 (describing develop-
ment and operation of staff attorneys); William M. Goodman & Thorn G. Seaton, Foreword:
Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court,
62 CAL. L. REv. 309, 312-13 (1974) (discussing staff and decision-making process).
The California Supreme Court has more law clerks and staff attorneys per justice than
any other state. See Thomas B. Marvell, State Appellate Court Response to Caseload Growth,
72 JUDICATURE 282, 287 (1989) (indicating that California had 6.3 staff aides per justice in
1984, compared to national average of 2.3).
77. See Grodin, supra note 2, at 519 n.13.
From time to time it is suggested, usually by someone outside the court, that the
workload each justice can handle could be increased if greater responsibility was
delegated to his or her staff,... I doubt that I could delegate responsibility further to
any significant extent and still perform what I consider to be my constitutional
obligation.
Id. See REYNOLDS, supra note 7, § 4.5(d), at 46, who states:
The increase in staff has led to a change in the way courts operate. No longer
can decisions be thought to be the exclusive work of the judges themselves. Today's
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the "bureaucratization of the judiciary."" s The president of the Ameri-
can Bar Association has admonished the California Supreme Court that
its reliance on staff to write opinions was "dangerous. '79 Other measures
are similarly controversial, such as the practice of transferring and re-
transferring cases to the court of appeal. s
In 1989 the supreme court adopted a policy of issuing its decisions
within ninety days of submission.81 Thus, it now "voluntarily" com-
plies 2 with the constitutional time limit for rendering decisions after
submission. 3 "'The court believes the new procedures may ultimately
result in a speedier disposition of cases.' "84 Not everyone is impressed
judge runs a small law office-several clerks, central staff, even student interns-and
the decisions generally must be thought of as a product of that office.... [I]n minor
cases and in other areas of decision-making-such as deciding whether to grant cer-
tiorari or to hear oral argument-staff play a large (and largely unacknowledged)
role in today's appellate decision making.
Id
78. See Marvell, supra note 76, at 286 (stating that "many fear that the judges are delegat-
ing too much of the decision process" to their staff attorneys).
79. Becky Morrow, Janofsky Hits State High Court's Review Process, L.A. DAILY J., Feb.
29, 1980, at 1, 24; see also Robert S. Thompson, Mitigating the Damage: One Judge and No
Judge Appellate Decisions, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 476, 513-16 (1975) (discussing role of staff attor-
neys and inherent danger in relying too heavily on them).
80. Bernard Witkin described this as an" 'appellate musical chairs gimmick."' Gonzalez
v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 146, 189 Cal. Rptr. 696, 711 (1983) (Hanson, J., concur-
ring) (quoting BERNARD E. WITHIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS § 38
(1977)), vacated, 154 Cal. App. 3d 583, 201 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1984) (depublished July 12, 1984).
It is
a feat of judicial prestidigitation that makes part of the workload disappear because
you don't see where it was. The underlying notion is that you rid yourself of over-
load by transferring part of that load to another tribunal .... When our Supreme
Court transfers a matter to itself and then retransfers that matter to a Court of Ap-
peal for decision, it may be a good deal for the Supreme Court, but in no sense does it
relieve the appellate system's overload.
Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12 (Hanson, J., concurring) (depublished, July 12, 1984).
81. A case is typically submitted at time of oral argument or filing of post-hearing briefs.
Professor Barnett criticizes the court's 90-day rule as "simply shift[ing] much of the decision-
making process from after the oral argument to before it." Barnett, supra note 75, at 46. He
explains that the justices "vote on the case and draft their dissenting and concurring opinions
before the argument." Id.; see also State High Court Begins 1980 With Reduced Case Load,
L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 2, 1980, at 1 (reporting that "Chief Justice Rose Bird is delaying hearing
arguments on cases in order to keep within the 90-day limit").
82. See Barnett, supra note 75, at 46. Not all have viewed the court's compliance with the
90-day rule as discretionary. In July 1979, a lawsuit was filed against the justices by the Law
and Order Campaign Committee seeking to compel the justices' compliance or have them
forfeit their paychecks. See State High Court Begins 1980 With Reduced Case Load, supra
note 81.
83. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 19.
84. Hager, supra note 13, at A37 (quoting Supreme Court Public Information Officer
Lynn Holton).
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with the ninety-day rule, however. Dean Gerald Uelmen sees it as con-
tributing to, rather than ameliorating, the court's backlog."5
Perhaps the most controversial of the supreme court's policy inno-
vations is the growing practice of "depublication." Rather than accept a
case for review, the court, if it disagrees with the opinion below, can
simply order that the opinion not be published in the official reports.
8 6
Depublication is intended to deprive the lower court opinion of stare
decisis effect,8" while not affecting the judgment in the case. It makes the
decision "non-law,"88 as if it had never been published in the first place.89
Rather than resolving conflict or explaining the error of a lower court
decision, depublication relieves the supreme court of its obligation to "se-
cure uniformity of decision" and "settle[ ] important questions of law." 90
Disagreement with court of appeal decisions thus results in nullification
85. Gerald F. Uelmen, Losing Steam, CAL. LAW., June 1990, at 33, 42. According to
Uelmen,
[t]he chief cause of the court's productivity drop is undoubtedly the 90-day rule,
which... has shifted much of [the court's] effort to the preargument stage.... [I]t is
taking much longer to make the trek from grant of hearing to calendar date for oral
argument. In response the court vigorously slashed the rate at which it granted new
hearings. Thus the slowdown promises to be more than a temporary phenomenon.
IdL
86. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14; CAL. R. Cr. 976(c)(2), 979. The criteria for publica-
tion of court of appeal decisions are contained in California Rule of Court 976(b). If a major-
ity of the court issuing the opinion certifies that it meets those criteria, the opinion is
published. Id 976(c)(1). However, the supreme court may order that any opinion which has
been certified for publication not be published, a practice referred to as "depublication." Id.
976(c)(2). See generally Grodin, supra note 2 (critiquing California Supreme Court depublica-
tion practice).
87. Opinions by the court of appeal that are not published may not "be cited or relied on
by a court or a party in any other action or proceeding." CAL. R. Cr. 977(a). Thus, a depub-
lished opinion is unavailable as precedent. See Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 872
n.8, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868, 873 n.8 (1974).
88. REYNOLDS, supra note 7, § 3.9, at 32. This contrasts with the practice in federal
court. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3.
Unpublished opinions are precedent. However, because every opinion believed to
have precedential value is published, an unpublished opinion should normally be
cited only when it (1) establishes the law of the case, (2) is relied upon as a basis for
res judicata or collateral estoppel, or (3) involves related facts. If an unpublished
opinion is cited, a copy shall be attached to each copy of the brief.
IdL
89. Professor Reynolds is critical of the entire practice of nonpublication.
[L]imited publication diminishes both judicial responsibility and accountability....
[Tihe unpublished list is a convenient place for a court to unload opinions in areas
where it is unwilling (or unable) to make its decisions known; that is, limited publica-
tion can be used deliberately by a court to avoid deciding according to the rules of
stare decisis.
REYNOLDS, supra note 7, § 3.9, at 33; see also DAvIEs, supra note 4, at 139-42 (because most
decisions are not published, court decides most cases in particularistic fashion in which consid-
erations regarding integrity of legal doctrine play diminished role).
90. CAL. R. Cr. 29.
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rather than correction.91 Despite the criticism, 92 the court has found
depublication to be an increasingly useful vehicle to reduce its caseload. 93
Despite these innovations, a "deluge of litigation" 94 continues to in-
undate our courts. One often-heard explanation for burgeoning dockets
and their attendant congestion is the so-called "litigation explosion" in
American society.95 We seem to resort to judicial dispute resolution
mechanisms more often than other industrialized societies. For instance,
in 1989, nearly 100 million cases were filed in the United States.96 In
1990, more than eleven million civil and criminal cases were filed in Cali-
fornia.9v Yet, as Professor Scheiber explains, such large-scale resort to
91. Disagreement with lower court decisions historically has been a prime factor influenc-
ing review both at the United States and California Supreme Courts. DAVIES, supra note 4, at
123 (citing Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24
U. CHI. L. Rv. 211, 214-15 (1957)).
92. Many have strongly criticized the court for its depublication practices. See, eg., Bar-
nett, supra note 75, at 116. "Since the court is now depublishing as many cases as it decides by
opinion, it seems extraordinary that the court's official statement of its practices and proce-
dures scarcely mentions this practice. One can only conclude that the court is embarrassed
about depublication, as it should be." Id; see also Robert S. Gerstein, "Law by Elimination:"
Depublication in ihe California Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 293, 294-95 (1984) (criticizing
selective publication). See generally Grodin, supra note 2, at 520-23 (discussing criticisms of
depublication procedures).
93. The supreme court began using the practice in 1971, when it ordered three cases
depublished. See Julie H. Biggs, Note, Decertification of Appellate Opinions: The Need for
Articulated Judicial Reasoning and Certain Precedent in California Law, 50 S. CAL. L. REV.
1181, 1200 (1977). In following years, it decertified an average of 20 court of appeal opinions
per year. See id at 1200-06. However, "[b]y 1982, the court was decertifying appellate court
opinions at the rate of one-hundred-and-eighteen a year, twelve per cent of the published opin-
ions of the court of appeal. This approached the total number of opinions of the California
high court in the same period." Thompson, supra note 12, at 2051 (footnote omitted) (citing
Gideon Kanner & Gerald F. Uelmen, Random Assignment, Random Justice, L.A. LAw., Feb.
1984, at 10, 14; see also supra note 30.
94. Richard H. Bein et al., The Court of Review: A New Court for California?, 47 CAL. ST.
B.J. 28, 36 (1972).
95. See Marvell, supra note 76, at 282 & n.1 ("The appellate caseload explosion and the
resulting pressures on the courts are hard to exaggerate.").
96. Randall Samborn, Filings Outpace the Gains, NAT'L L.J., July 1, 1991, at 26 (report-
ing 98.4 million state court filings in 1989, "including: 17.3 million civil cases; 12.5 million
criminal cases; 1.4 million juvenile cases; and 67.2 million traffic or other ordinance violations.
Federal trial courts, by comparison, reported 223,113 new civil filings and 62,042 new criminal
cases in 1989.").
97. Philip Hager, Lucas Details Plan for Studying Drug Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1991,
at A3, A24. When routine traffic and parking matters are included, the number jumps to 18
million. Hager, supra note 13, at A37. In the Los Angeles Superior Court alone, more than
300,000 civil cases were filed in 1991. Randall Samborn, Courting Solutions: Rising Caseloads
Spur Judiciaries to Seek Solutions, NAT'L L.J., July 1, 1991, at 27.
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the courts "is of long historic standing-a feature of our society as Amer-
ican as apple pie."98
What is undoubtedly true, however, is that California's population
has outpaced its judicial resources.9 9 Our state has the same number of
supreme court justices now-seven-as it did in 1879; the court is consti-
tuted in basically the. same way, and it is vested with similar jurisdic-
tion."° Yet, the state's population has increased thirty-five fold, from
864,964 in 1880101 to nearly thirty million in 1990.10 Similar but less
dramatic comparisons could be made for the court of appeal as well. 103
This point has not escaped the chief justice"° or other members of the
court. 105
Population increases alone, or in relation to the quantum of judicial
resources, do not fully explain court congestion and delay. Professor
Scheiber believes that the "'legal culture' of the lawyers, court officials,
and judges" plays an important role in "determin[ing] the pace at which
cases move (or fail to move) through the civil courts."' 0 6 For example,
delay can become part of widely shared litigation strategies. Other fac-
tors, such as business and political trends, frequency of settlements, pros-
98. Scheiber, supra note 14, at 3. Professor Scheiber disputes the notion of any recent
"litigation explosion." He states that "[e]ven in the last thirty years, the litigation rate (cases
filed in proportion to population) has been fairly steady, and it appears likely that the rates
were probably higher-perhaps much, much higher-a century ago in California." Id. at 3-4.
99. Two decades ago it was suggested that the California Supreme Court reached the up-
per limit of the amount of work it can do. PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGEs 3, 194-200
(1981).
100. See SUPREME COURT OF CAL., supra note 53, at 7-10.
101. ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 200B (1992).
102. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND Booic OF FACTS 74-75 (1992).
103. See generally DAVIES, supra note 4, at 320-40 (discussing generally growth of appel-
late litigation in, California courts from 1905-1976). "[S]tatistics indicate that a growing
caseload has been the normal condition for the Courts of Appeal since their creation." Id. at
320. There were three "district courts of appeal" when first created in 1904. Id. The legisla-
ture was authorized by constitutional amendment in 1928 to increase the number of districts
and create divisions within each district. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 3. There are now six districts
with a total of 18 divisions. Richard G. Wallace, Comment, Attorney Discipline and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court: Transfer of Direct Review to the Courts of Appeal, 72 CAL. L. REV. 252,
255 (1984).
104. In his 1990 State of the Judiciary Address to the California Legislature, Chief Justice
Lucas complained that the size of the supreme court has remained unchanged since 1879:
"'There were seven justices then and there are seven justices now .... In that time, however,
the numbers of people, of lawyers, of cases ified and of lower court judges have increased
exponentially."' Hager, supra note 13 (quoting Lucas, C.J.).
105. See Kaufman, supra note 22, at 32 ("[Ihe public and the Legislature must be willing
to provide adequate resources to handle the tremendous growth in the population and the
inevitable increase in litigation in California in the last 25 years.").
106. Scheiber, supra note 14, at 5 (citing Larry L. Sipes, Managing to Reduce Delay, 56
CAL. ST. B.J. 104 (1981)).
June 1993] A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1101
ecution policies, sentencing and changes in the substantive law, all affect
patterns of litigation.107 Perhaps, the increase in the number of Califor-
nia lawyers might by itself suggest a cause of the "litigation
explosion." 108
Based on the multiple factors affecting litigation patterns, raw num-
bers alone may tell us little or nothing about judicial efficiency. Indeed,
in the dual-judicial system of American federalism, an analysis of state
courts reveals only one-half of the picture. Shifting preferences between
state and federal court adjudication, often having little to do with the
relative availability of judicial resources, complicate any quantitative
analysis." 9 In some respects, federal courts have greater control over
their dockets than state courts. The former have limited jurisdiction,
while the latter are deemed courts of general jurisdiction. It is not diffi-
cult for federal courts concerned with docket congestion to use and abuse
jurisdiction-avoidance devices as a means of shifting their caseloads to
state courts. 10
107. For a thorough description of the various social and jurisprudential forces affecting
California courts, see Scheiber, supra note 14, at 13-27; see also Richard Lempert, Docket Data
and "Local Knowledge'" Studying the Court and Society Link Over Time, 24 LAw & Soc.
REv. 321, 327-28 (1990) (discussing factors affecting docket data surveys); and John Goerdt,
Examining Court Delay: The Pace Of Litigation In 26 Urban Trial Courts (1989),
microformed on National Center for State Courts (William S. Hein & Co., Inc.) (giving
caseload statistics and survey methodology).
Chief Justice Warrdi Burger remarked to the ABA's winter convention in New Orleans,
February 6, 1983:
The [caseload] problems we face have resulted from the growth of the country,
changes in science and engineering, the increasing complexity of society, the increas-
ing complexity of the structure of business and industry, the enlargement of rights of
individuals, changes in the relationships of people to government, and, underlying all
this, the increasing litigiousness of our people.
Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 146, 189 Cal. Rptr. 696, 708 (1983) (Hanson, J.,
concurring) (quoting Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Remarks to the American Bar Associa-
tion (Feb. 26, 1983)), vacated, 154 Cal. App. 3d 583, 201 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1984) (depublished
July 12, 1984). In California, "the justices of the courts of appeal perceived the rising volume
of criminal appeals as resulting from the stimulation of the Warren Court's due process deci-
sions." DAvIEs, supra note 4, at 333.
108. Professor Scheiber reports that the number of lawyers in California increased 481%
from 1960 to 1990. Scheiber, supra note 14, at 29.
109. Professor Scheiber describes these as the "'federal effects' on change in the California
courts." Id. at 23.
110. The several abstention doctrines permit federal courts to "defer" to state court adjudi-
cation, even in uniquely federal cases. See, eg., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971);
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). Expanding jurisdictional bars,
such as the Eleventh Amendment, claim preclusion, exhaustion doctrines and narrowing inter-
pretations of substantive federal law, all serve to prohibit or dissuade federal adjudication.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court's control over its own docket, and the elimination of
mandatory appeal jurisdiction, may put subtle pressures on state courts to grant discretionary
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The fact remains, however, that "California's archaic, horse-and-
buggy, system of appellate review is too slow and too costly." '111 Im-
provement is not on the horizon, at least if statistical trends over the past
two decades are any indication.
III. CASELOAD TRENDS
This section describes the caseload of the California Supreme Court
over a twenty-one year period, from fiscal year 1970-1971 through 1990-
1991. This two-decade period was chosen because it spans several differ-
ent courts and judicial eras. It is sufficiently long enough to make mean-
ingful comparisons in key areas. Some trends are discernible over the
period.
First, some general observations. The supreme court's total work-
load has nearly doubled in the past two decades.' 12 As impressive as this
appears, it is matched by statistics for other courts. For instance, case
filings in the federal circuit courts grew eightfold from 1960 to 1987.13
Filings in the United States Supreme Court grew from 1181 in the 1950
term, to over 4000 annually in the 1980s. 114 A survey of state courts
shows that in a recent ten-year period, the number of appeals more than
doubled. 15
These other figures are not meant to downplay the impact of accel-
erated case filings in the California Supreme Court. Cases continue to
stream into the court at the rate of up to 180 per week-triple the load
twenty-five years ago. The justices spend up to half of their time simply
determining which of these cases to review.1 16 This takes an obvious toll
on the court's ability to hear and decide cases.
review. See generally FRIESEN, supra note 9 (discussing independent use and interpretation of
state bills of rights in civil and criminal litigation).
111. Gonzalez, 140 Cal. App. 3d 146, 189 Cal: Rptr. at 712 (Hanson, J., concurring)
(depublished, July 12, 1984).
112. The court notes an even sharper increase in the 25-year period prior to 1987-1988.
Total business transacted increased 200% during that time from 2233 to 7189 matters. The
comparison for case filings is also dramatic. They totalled 4390 in fiscal year 1987-1988, in-
cluding 3241 petitions for review (appeal) from the court of appeal. This is compared with
one-third as many filings (1562) and one-quarter as many petitions for hearing (907) in 1962-
1963. SUPREME COURT OF CAL., supra note 53, at 2.
113. Robert L. Stern, Remedies for Appellate Overloads: The Ultimate Solution, 72 JUDICA-
TURE 103, 103 (1988).
114. Id.
115. Id Many sources provide statistics on the appellate caseload in California. See, e.g.,
CAL. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY AND CRIM. JUSTICE COMMS., supra note 21, at 76-86; DAVIES,
supra note 4. Perhaps the richest source of raw data is contained in the Annual Statistical
Survey of the California Judicial Council. The latter provides the source data for most of the
statistics reported here.
116. Hager, supra note 13, at A37.
1102 [Vol. 26:1085
June 1993] A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1103
A. Filings in the Supreme Court
There are several routes by which cases reach the California
Supreme Court. The most familiar is by appeal from a lower court. In
most appeals, the case is first heard by the court of appeal, followed by a
petition for review in the supreme court.117 Capital cases, however, by-
pass the court of appeal and are directly reviewed by the supreme
court. 18 The court also can review cases decided by the appellate de-
partment of the superior court, again bypassing the court of appeal. 1 9
The supreme court typically receives over 3000 petitions for review each
year, and accepts roughly five percent of them. 2
Cases also can be filed directly with the supreme court. It has origi-
nal jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings and in proceedings "for ex-
traordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition." '21 As with most of its docket, the court has discretion to
accept original proceedings for decision. It generally receives over 1000
such filings each year, but accepts only a small fraction of them. 22 The
court is partial to election disputes and challenges to initiative meas-
117. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12. The court "may, before decision, transfer to itself a cause
'in a court of appeal," id. § 12(a), although it is far more typical for the court to grant review
after decision by the court of appeal.
118. Id. § 11.
119. Id. § 11, 2. The appellate department of the superior court provides initial review of
cases tried in the municipal court. Id
120. See infra P. 1110, Chart 4.
121. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
122. In fiscal year 1990-1991, the California Supreme Court received 1184 filings in original
proceedings. 2 JUD. COUNCIL CAL. ANN. REP. 7 (1992) (Judicial Statistics for Fiscal Year
1990-1991) [hereinafter 1992 ANN. REP.]. The vast majority of these were habeas corpus
petitions (1022), while 99 were civil petitions and eight were appeals of Public Utilities Com-
mission orders. Id. In the same year, the court disposed of 1121 original proceedings, id,
1067 of which were without opinion, id at 13. This suggests that more than 95% were dis-
missed without a hearing. The table below, from the 1992 Annual Report, shows figures for
the past decade.
Year Filings Dispositions - No opinion % Granted
1981-82 675 * 514
1982-83 617 * 427
1983-84 747 * 585
1984-85 882 * 716
1985-86 974 * 789
1986-87 1,060 * 818
1987-88 1,125 * 918
1988-89 1,031 1,182 1,118 4%
1989-90 1,213 1,158 1,115 4%
1990-91 1,184 1,121 1,067 6%
* Dispositions are not reported for these years. Because the court does not necessar-
ily act on a filing in the same year as received, the number received and number
disposed are not directly comparable. See id. at 10-13.
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ures.123 These cases often raise significant or urgent public issues and
demand quick attention from the supreme court.1 24 Other cases filed di-
rectly in the supreme court are either dismissed outright or transferred to
the court of appeal for consideration.
Until very recently, the court received a large number of attorney
discipline matters. These cases reach the court after the State Bar has
recommended some form of disciplinary action against a member.1 25 At
its pinnacle, the court would hear oral argument and issue opinions in
roughly ten percent of the cases, while the rest of the cases would be
disposed of without a hearing. 126
B. Total Filings
Filings in the supreme court fall into four main categories: (1) peti-
tions for hearing following decision of the court of appeal; (2) original
proceedings; (3) attorney discipline; and (4) direct appeals (capital
cases).1 27 The combined total of these categories has increased steadily
over the past two decades, from 3166 in 1970-1971 to 5023 in 1990-1991.
Chart 1, on the next page, illustrates total filings for these and interven-
ing years.
12 8
123. See, eg., Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991),
cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1293 (1992) (upholding most of ballot
initiative that put limits on legislators' terms, pensions and appropriation powers). For an
illustration of a case taken under its original jurisdiction, see Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d
236, 241, 651 P.2d 274, 276, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (1982) ("It is uniformly agreed that the
issues are of great public importance and should be resolved promptly. Accordingly, under
well settled principles, it is appropriate that we exercise our original jurisdiction.").
124. For example, Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal. 4th 707, 823 P.2d 545, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 379 (1992),
was decided two, weeks after oral argument.
125. See infra Part V.
126. In 1989-1990, 488 attorney discipline matters were filed. 1992 ANN. REP., supra note
122, at 11. The following year, 48 such matters were decided. See infra pp. 1127-28, Charts
12, 13. Similar ratios for previous years indicate an average 10% opinion rate. These ratios
are based on the assumption of a one year lag time between filing and disposition.
127. There are other miscellaneous cases within the supreme court's jurisdiction, such as
review of Public Utilities Commission decisions. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1756, 1759
(West 1975 & Supp. 1993).
128. Data for the California court charts found in this Article are derived from the follow-
ing sources: 1992 ANN. REP., supra note 122; 2 JUD. COUNCIL CAL. ANN. REP. (1991) (Judi-
cial Statistics for Fiscal Year 1989-1990) [hereinafter 1991 ANN. REP.]; 2 JUD. COUNCIL CAL.
ANN. REP. (1990) (Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the California Courts)
[hereinafter 1990 ANN;. REP.]; and 2 JUD. COUNCIL CAL. ANN. REP. (1989) (Annual Report
of the Administrative Office of the California Courts) [hereinafter 1989 ANN. REP.]. The data
referred to in the chart on the following page are found in 1992 ANN. REP., supra note 122, at
7; 1991 ANN. REP., supra, at 7; 1990 ANN. REP., supra, at 24; and 1989 ANN. REP., supra, at
20.
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As the chart indicates, there has been modest but steady growth in
the total number of matters coming before the supreme court. Total fil-
ings have increased by an average of 100 cases-or approximately
2.5%--each year for the past two decades. This is a huge number of
cases, now exceeding 5000 filings per year. The court must sift through
these cases in a relatively brief amount of time. For instance, it must
decide whether to grant or deny review, or take other action, on 160 or
more cases each Wednesday at its weekly conference.129 These confer-
ences occupy an inordinate amount of the court's time. 3 In the mid-
1960s, the court had, on average, one-quarter as many cases on its con-
ference calendar.1
31
C. Petitions for Hearing and Review
Not surprisingly, the number of petitions for hearing 132 has risen
steadily. Increasing from 2200 in 1970-1971, to 3500 in 1990-1991, there
are now sixty percent more petitions than twenty years ago. The greatest
difference has been in criminal cases, where there has been a 265% in-
crease over the period, 133 compared to only a twenty-two percent in-
crease for civil petitions.134
Chart 2, on the following page, shows a fairly steady rate of civil
petitions for review, but a significant increase in the number of criminal
129. See Philip Carrizosa, Profile, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 2, 1984, at 1, 17; Kaufman, supra
note 22, at 28 (reporting average of 120 matters per conference in 1987-1988). For a thorough
description of the court's weekly conferences, see Grodin, supra note 2, at 517-18; supra note
116.
130. Justice Kaufman states that the court "spent 35 to 40 percent of [its] time in prepara-
tion and review of matters for Wednesday conferences." Kaufman, supra note 22, at 30; see
also Thompson, supra note 12, at 2027 ("The justices spent most of their time preparing for
and attending their weekly Wednesday conferences ... .
131. See Sosnick, supra note 52, at 722 & n.15.
132. A petition for hearing is an appeal from a decision by the court of appeal. See CAL. R.
Cr. 28. Petitions for hearing were redenominated "petitions for review" following the 1984
constitutional amendment allowing for partial review by the supreme court. See supra notes
69-74. The terms are used interchangeably in this Article.
133. In 1990-1991, there were 1792 petitions for review in criminal cases (consisting of
1342 regular criminal appeals and 450 appeals from original proceedings in the court of ap-
peal). See 1992 ANN. REP., supra note 122, at 8. In 1970-1971 there were only 675 petitions
for hearing (consisting of 624 regular criminal appeals and 51 appeals from original proceed-
ings). See id.
134. In 1990-1991, there were 1713 petitions for review in civil cases (consisting of 1102
regular appeals and 611 appeals from original proceedings in the court of appeal). Id. There
were 1401 petitions for hearing in 1970-1971 (consisting of 636 regular appeals and 765 ap-
peals from original proceedings).
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petitions filed.135 The pace of increase in petitions for hearing in the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court is less than that for many other state appellate
courts.13 6 For the country as a whole, "[a]ppeals have been doubling
about every decade since World War II. '1' 37
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The increase in filings in the California Supreme Court is also lower
than the rate of increase for state court of appeal decisions. In 1979-
1980, the court of appeal issued 3813 written opinions.138 They issued
135. Id.; 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 128, at 8; 1990 ANN. REP., supra note 128, at 24;
1989 ANN. REP., supra note 128, at 20.
136. See, ag., Marvell, supra note 76, at 283 (comparing growth in appeals filed for 46
states).
137. Id. at 282. "In the 40 states with both filing and decision data, the ten-year growth
averaged 123 per cent for filings and 115 per cent for decisions." Id. at 284.
138. JUD. COUNCIL CAL. ANN. REP. (1974) (Judicial Statistics for Fiscal Year 1972-1973)
[hereinafter 1974 ANN. RP.].
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10,017 written opinions for 1990-1991,119 a 263% increase in twenty
years. This compares to only a sixty percent increase in the total number
of petitions for hearing filed in the supreme court during the same period.
Another way to look at the data is to compare the ratio of petitions
for review in the supreme court to the number of written decisions in the
court of appeal. In 1979-1980, nearly one-half of the written decisions by
the court of appeal were appealed to the supreme court.1" In 1990-199 1,
however, less than one-third of the written court of appeal decisions were
appealed.
Chart 3, on page 1109, is obtained from the annual report of the
Judicial Council for 1992. It shows petitions for hearing and their rela-
tion to court of appeal decisions. The drop-off in court of appeal deci-
sions being appealed to the supreme court may be due to the diminishing
likelihood of having one's petition granted. Chart 4, on page 1110,
shows the total number of petitions for review granted from 1970-1971
through 1990-1991 and as a percentage of total petitions filed.114
D. Business Transacted
The great volume of cases demands greater judicial productivity,
142
but ultimately contributes to judicial bum-out. "[J]ustices of the
Supreme Court must and do work six and a half to seven days a week, 10
or so hours a day, with rarely a day off and in most cases without signifi-
cant vacation."' 4 The cause for this overload is no mystery. The court
transacts nearly ten thousand items of business each year. These consist
principally of petitions for hearing, orders and case dispositions. 1 4
139. 1992 ANN. REP., supra note 122, at 9.
140. These figures were derived from the 1992 and 1989 Judicial Council Annual Reports,
supra notes 122 and 128. The 1989 report shows that there were 6659 dispositions by written
opinion in the court of appeal in 1979-1980. 1989 ANN. REP., supra note 128, at 51. In 3183
of these cases, petitions for hearing were filed in the supreme court. This is a 48% appeal rate.
The number of petitions for hearing (following disposition by the court of appeal) re-
mained fairly constant throughout the 1980s, but the number of cases decided by written opin-
ion in the court of appeal rose significantly. In 1990-1991, the court of appeal issued an
estimated 10,716 written dispositions, of which 3505 (33%) were appealed to the supreme
court by way of petitioned for review. 1992 ANN. REP., supra note 122, at 12, 26.
141. 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 128, at 9.
142. Nationally, there has been "an astounding increase in judicial productivity [from 1968-
1984]. The main response to the appeals explosion, therefore, has been greater output per
judge and only secondarily, more judicial capacity." Marvell, supra note 76, at 285.
143. Kaufman, supra note 22, at 29.
144. In 1990-1991 the court received 3505 petitions for hearing and 54 for rehearing, issued
3510 miscellaneous orders, disposed of 1067 original proceedings without opinion, and decided
127 cases by written opinion. 1992 ANN. REP., supra note 122, at 12-14.
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Chart 5, on page 1111, reflects total business transacted over the
past two decades. It shows a steady rise through the 1983-1984 fiscal
year, with a noticeable drop off after that. The upward trend has re-
sumed in recent years, now approaching its historic high. 145
E. Written Opinions
As the amount of business increases relentlessly, the number of writ-
ten opinions declines correspondingly. In 1970-1971, the supreme court,
under Chief Justice Donald Wright, decided 202 cases by written opin-
ion. That number dropped to eighty-six in 1986-1987, the tumultuous
year of personnel change on the court. 146 Since then, the number of writ-
ten opinions has remained in the 100 to 130 range.
In contrast, the number of cases disposed of without written opinion
is now twice that of a decade ago. The following chart shows the number
of cases decided by written opinion, and those without opinion,
respectively. 147
CHART 6
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145. 1992 ANN. RFP., supra note 122, at 13.
146. See infra notes 158-62.
147. 1992 ANN. EP., supra note 122, at 7.
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The foregoing charts describe the business of the California Supreme
Court in gross terms, lumping the different categories of cases together.
Yet, one of the principal focal points for judicial reform is in the area of
the court's capital jurisdiction. The following sections detail the court's
caseload in two specific areas: direct capital appeals and attorney disci-
pline. By segregating these classes of cases for examination, more in-
formed impressions may be available for discussion.
IV. CAPITAL JURISDICTION CASELOAD
The California Supreme Court has always had appellate jurisdiction
in capital cases.148 When the court of appeal was created in 1904, capital
cases were excluded from its jurisdiction, thus permitting direct appeal to
the supreme court. 14 9 California Supreme Court review of death
sentences became mandatory in 1935.150 This is consistent with the prac-
tice in most other states.15 Indeed, mandatory review of death sentences
by a state's highest court was seemingly required in Gregg v. Georgia,152
the United States Supreme Court decision that reauthorized the death
penalty in 1976.153 The Court has since then backed off from particular-
ized mechanisms of review.
1 54
In California, the number of capital cases reviewed has grown from
a relatively small number155 to become one of the largest areas of
supreme court business in recent years. The California Supreme Court
devotes a greater share of its attention to capital cases than do high
148. Robert Weisberg, Death Penalty Appeals in California, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 243,
251 (1988); see CAL. CONSr. art. VI, § 11.
149. Weisberg, supra note 148, at 251.
150. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 11; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1993) (stating that appeal of death penalty is automatic).
151. Weisberg, supra note 148, at 251. The Judicial Council reported that, as of 1987, all 36
states with a death penalty provided for mandatory appeal to the state's highest court. Id. at
251 n.27. In Oklahoma and Texas ultimate review is by their special courts of criminal ap-
peals. Id at 251. Only two of the states, Ohio and Alabama,'route their capital cases through
their intermediate appellate courts before high court review of a death sentence. Id at 251-52.
152. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
153. The death penalty was briefly viewed as unconstitutional, principally for its inherent
procedural defects. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally Karl Manheim,
The Capital Punishment Cases: A Criticism of Judicial Method, 12 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 85
(1978) (criticizing failure of U.S. Supreme Court to develop coherent standards in capital
cases).
154. Weisberg, supra note 148, at 253.
155. "[The] practice [of direct review] can be traced historically to a period when only eight
death sentences had to be reviewed each year, and they were disposed of with the same routine
dispatch as other criminal cases." Gerald F. Uelmen, Dissent: Supreme Court Reform: Diver-
sion Instead of Division, 11 PEPP. L. Rnv. 5, 6 (1983).
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courts from most other states. 5 6 Partly because of this volume, the de-
lay between filing and decision in capital cases is substantial." 7
The court's capital jurisdiction has been the eye of several storms. 5 8
Perhaps the best known controversy was the 1986 retention election of
Chief Justice Rose Bird and her associate justices.'59 Another justice,
Otto Kaus, announced his resignation before the election.' 6" To a large
measure, the campaign focused on the court's record in overturning
death sentences.' 61 Three of the justices standing for election were voted
out of office.162 Governor Deukmejian was able to reconstitute the court
with judges more inclined to uphold death sentences.'
63
However, the Lucas Court's record on capital cases has not come
without cost. The sheer number'" and volume165 of capital cases may
impede the court's ability to handle other cases, both civil and noncapital
criminal. The emerging backlog and delay in capital cases has become
156. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
157. As of 1986, delay averaged three-and-one-half years. Cook & Kang, Facing Judgment,
S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 15, 1986, at 11.
158. For instance, while Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), was pending in the
United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court declared the death penalty uncon-
stitutional under the state constitution. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 656, 493 P.2d 880,
899, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), superseded by CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 67.
159. The associate justices were Joseph Grodin, Malcolm Lucas, Stanley Mosk, Edward
Panelli and Cruz Reynoso.
160. Justice Kaus officially retired on October 16, 1985, but remained on the court until the
end of the 1985 term.
161. The Bird court reversed 52 death sentences out of 55 cases reviewed between 1977 and
1985. See Kenneth Jost, Court's Scoreboard Hides Important Shift, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 6,
1986, at 2. The state supreme court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Donald Wright,
Bird's predecessor, reversed the death sentence in all 176 capital cases that came before it. Id.
162. Justices Lucas, Mosk and Panelli did not face any significant opposition and survived
the election. Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1986, at Al.
163. In one of its early capital cases, the Lucas court overruled or restricted many of its
predecessor's precedents. People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82
(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988). The indications turned out to be correct. For exam-
ple, during its fourth term, 1990-1991, the Lucas court affirmed 29 of the 30 death penalty
cases it reviewed. See Uelmen, supra note 30, at 37.
164. In 1984, the supreme court's docket had approximately 150 pending capital cases. See
Grodin, supra note 2, at 519 n. 11.
165. The average length of a capital record on appeal is about 6000 pages, but many records
exceed 20,000 pages. Weisberg, supra note 148, at 247. The opinions in capital cases also tend
to be lengthy. See, eg., People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 821 P.2d 610, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106
(1991) (119, 79 and 79 pages in length), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 152 (1992). However, it may
be a mistake to equate the length of trial records with the difficulty or burden of particular
cases. See Frank M. Coffin, Research for Efficiency and Quality: Review of Managing Appeals
in Federal Courts, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1857, 1861 (1990) ("[IThe bulk of the record of a
particular case was no reliable predictor of its burden .... ").
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legendary. 166 There was an upsurge in capital cases following the United
States Supreme Court's pronouncements and California's own corrective
surgery by statute and initiative.' 67 Many of the cases during the 1980s
dealt with broad-based constitutional challenges to and statutory inter-
pretation of capital sentencing laws.' 68 But with many of the core issues
decided, the California Supreme Court's recent cases mostly involve ad
hoe applications of death sentences.'
69
The court appears to be growing weary of its capital caseload. This
is made apparent in several ways. First, there has been unusually rapid
turnover on the court. While it would be facile to attribute retirements
from the court solely to the capital caseload, it is undoubtedly a contrib-
uting cause.' 70 The court also has been accused of treating appointed
counsel poorly in death penalty cases.' 7 ' If true, this practice could be
166. See generally Weisberg, supra note 148, at 246-51 (discussing delay and backlog in
supreme court).
167. The death penalty was revived in California by initiative amendment of the state con-
stitution, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27, followed by then state Senator George Deukmejian's bill,
Act of Aug. 11, 1977, 1977 CAL. STAT. 1256 (amending scattered sections of CAL. PENAL
CODE) (Senate Bill 155), which passed over Governor Brown's veto in 1977. The law was
modeled after the Georgia capital sentencing law upheld by the United States Supreme Court
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In 1978, the Briggs Initiative superseded the 1977
law and specified additional crimes eligible for the death penalty. 1978 CAL. STAT. PROP. 7
(codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993)). Proposition 8 relaxed
certain procedural protections in criminal cases. Victims' Bill of Rights Initiative Measure
Proposition 8 (approved June 8, 1982) (codified at CAL. CONST art. I, §§ 12, 28; CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 25, 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West Supp. 1992); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West Supp. 1992)).
168. See, eg., Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79
(1983), overruled by People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1987) (mandating intent-to-kill requirement in death penalty initiative); People v. Ramos, 30
Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982) (discussingconstitutionality of jury
instructions), rev'd sub nom., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1119 (1985) (discussing constitutionality of jury instructions).
169. See Gerald F. Uelman, Lucas Court: First Year Report, CAL. LAw., June 1988, at 30.
170. For instance, Justices John A. Arguelles and Marcus M. Kaufman recently retired,
although they served on the court less than three years. "Although neither publicly cited the
caseload as the reason for stepping down, both acknowledged that the load was a difficult one
for the court." Hager, supra note 13, at A37. But see Kaufman, supra note 22, at 30 (noting
Justice Kaufman's disagreement with assertion that "death penalty review is responsible for
the premature retirement of justices of the court").-
"'The burden is very, very heavy at the Supreme Court.'" Hager, supra note 13, at A37
(quoting Justice Harry Low of First District Court of Appeal). "'Five years from now, 10
years from now, will anyone want to subject themselves to that huge volume of work all the
time? Some new methods have to be looked at.... If you spend all your energy on death
cases, civil cases have to be neglected."' Id. (quoting Justice Harry Low of First District
Court of Appeal).
171. See Grace Suarez, It's the Court's Fault, CAL. LAW., June. 1990, at 130, 130. One
lawyer stated: "Their payments are delayed for months; amounts owed are cut back with no
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counterproductive. Not only are many of the dedicated capital lawyers
refusing to take new cases,' 72 the court is spending its valuable time
combing expense statements and finding other counsel.'73 "Some other-
wise sane and sober lawyers are beginning to talk about filing a lawsuit
against the high court, and about going on strike."' 74
A. Historical Trends
A review of the California Supreme Court's capital caseload over
the past two decades shows that the court spends a considerable amount
of its judicial energy on death penalty cases, leaving less time to handle
civil and noncapital criminal cases. It is easy and ultimately dangerous
to draw simple conclusions from these stark statistics. Numbers alone
cannot measure whether the court is failing to keep pace with develop-
ments in civil and general criminal law."' Although fewer cases are be-
ing decided by the court, they may cut as broad a jurisprudential swath
as in previous eras. Ultimately, this is a subjective question, requiring
that the legal community draw on its collective judgment to decide
whether the court is adequately doing its job.
Chart 7, on the following page, shows the number of direct appeals
filed since 1970-1971. It indicates a marked upsurge in appeals following
the reimposition of the death penalty in 1977. The number reached its
peak in 1981-1982, when forty-three capital appeals were filed with the
supreme court. The number tapered off until the judicial retention elec-
tion of 1986, when the death penalty was a focal point. Shortly after
replacement justices were appointed in 1987, the number of capital filings
rose significantly, but declined after the initial upsurge.'
76
explanation whatever; requests for funds to pay experts and investigators are denied. The
result is that attorneys who represent capital defendants suffer, both financially and emotion-
ally .... " Id.
172. Id
173. Id "The situation is deteriorating rapidly-that is clear from the increase in the
number of unrepresented [capital] appellants." Id.
174. Id.
175. For instance, Justice Kaufman is critical of statistics-driven conclusions about the
court's job performance. Kaufman, supra note 22, at 30. He contends that "[t]he assumption
that the Supreme Court's preoccupation with death penalty cases is preventing the court from
granting review in important civil cases is based on misleading statistics.... [T]o my knowl-
edge no case involving important issues of statewide significance was denied review." Id.
176. Data for filed capital cases was obtained from the Judicial Council Annual Reports
described supra note 128. It relates to "automatic appeals," which the reports describe as
"death penalty cases." E.g., 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 128, at 7. For the number of capital
cases decided between 1987 and 1992, see Gerald F. Uelmen, Plunging into the Political
Thicket, CAL. LAw., June 1992, at 31, 36.
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Because the California Supreme Court has little control over its cap-
ital caseload, the trends in the above chart are caused mostly by external
events. For instance, political and legal phenomena probably affect the
number of filings, and ultimately the number of cases the court must
decide.
The percentage of time the court spends on capital cases in relation
to other matters determines the impact the court's capital jurisdiction
has on its ability to hear other cases. No direct data is available, and the
anecdotal evidence is conflicting. Former justices have widely different
assessments of the impact that capital cases have on the court.17 7 The
issue may be approached indirectly, however, in a number of ways.
177. Justice Kaufman believes that the court's capital caseload is not problematic: "I
would estimate that consideration of death penalty issues did not take more than 20 percent of
our time." Kaufman, supra note 22, at 30. Justice Grodin's assessment is different:
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One method would be to compare the number of capital and non-
capital cases decided in any given year. Dean Gerald Uelmen of Santa
Clara Law School has done just that. His annual report in the California
Lawyer describes the work product of the court. Starting in 1987, Dean
Uelmen has tracked the case output by category. 178 Since then, the court
has averaged twenty-six death penalty cases per year, and sixteen other
criminal cases. It also has heard an average of thirty-two attorney disci-
pline matters, and thirty-eight civil cases.
179
Another indirect method to measure the impact of capital caseload
would be to tally the total number of pages written in capital cases com-
pared to the court's other decisions. Dean Uelmen has done this for
1990-199.18 He reports that one quarter of the court's total written
product involved capital cases, some of which were tomes in their own
right. 181
A third method, and one done here, would be to compare the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's caseload with that of other states. This also, in-
directly, may measure the significance of capital jurisdiction on the
court's workload.
B. Comparison With Other States
This section compares the caseload of the California Supreme Court
with that of five other states: Florida, New Jersey, New York, Ohio and
Texas. These states were chosen primarily because they are populous
and have demographics similar to those of California. Texas and Florida
have, respectively, the highest and second highest rate of capital sentenc-
[D]eath penalty cases consume a disproportionate share of the court's resources of
staff and judges alike-I would estimate anywhere from three to ten times the re-
sources expended on the average case.... The more capital cases there are, the less
likely it is that the court will be able to perform its other duties adequately.
JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE 100-01 (1989).
178. See Uelmen, supra note 169, at 30 ("[Tlhe crushing load of death penalty appeals
means the court no longer has time to function as the architect of California case law.").
179. According to Dean Uelmen, the court's written opinions were comprised as follows:
Year Civil Capital Other Crim. Discipline Total
1986-87 53 12 33 8 106
1987-88 26 16 9 29 80
1988-89 41 55 15 31 142
1989-90 28 19 15 43 105
1990-91 40 30 7 48 125
5-year Average 38 26 16 32 112
180. Uelmen, supra note 169, at 33.
181. Id. at 34.
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ing and execution in the country.18 2 New York is closest in population to
California, but has no death penalty. 1 3 Ohio is one of the few states with
intermediate review in capital cases.I84 Texas directs its capital cases to a
special court of criminal appeals, reserving its state supreme court for
civil cases.' 85 This bifurcation occurred in 1876 "[t]o relieve the
Supreme Court of some of its caseload."'
186
It is necessary to be cautious when making comparisons such as
those contained here if the purpose is to predict how California's appel-
late dockets would respond to reform. A variety of indeterminable fac-
tors affect the statistical analysis. As Professor Weisberg notes: "[W]e
would have to account for such interstate variables as the murder rate,
the behavior of prosecutors and juries, the substantive capital murder
law, the doctrinal behavior of the state appellate courts, and the role of
the federal habeas courts with jurisdiction over those states.'
8 7
Nonetheless, it may be instructive to view graphically California's
docket as compared to the dockets of these five other states.' 88 The re-
sults are dramatic. Chart 8 shows the total number of capital cases de-
cided by each of the six states for 1990 or 1991.189
182. Florida capital offenses are defined in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(b) (West 1992),
and the consequences of a conviction are set forth in id. § 775.082 (West 1992). Texas capital
offenses are defined in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993). A convic-
tion may result in a penalty of death. IL § 12.31 (West Supp. 1993).
183. See N.Y. PENAL CODE § 70.00 (McKinney 1987) (describing felony penalties that do
not include death penalty).
184. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(a)(ii); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05 (Anderson
1987). Ohio's death penalty is contained in OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01, 2929.02,
2929.04 (Anderson 1987).
185. Texas has a bifurcated high court. The supreme court hears civil cases only, while the
court of criminal appeals is the highest court for criminal cases. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1.
Capital cases are automatically reviewed by the court of criminal appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P.
40(b). Oklahoma also places capital jurisdiction in a separate court of criminal appeals. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.13 (1991).
186. 1991 TEx. JUD. Sys. ANN. REP. 16 (Office of Court Administration, Austin, 1991).
187. Weisberg, supra note 148, at 260.
188. The states use slightly different reporting periods and have different delays in publish-
ing statistics. The figures were obtained from the following sources: New York (calendar year
1990), STATE OF N.Y., THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE COURTS 31, tbl. 11 (1991); New Jersey (court year 1990-1991), N.J. JUDICIARY, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, 1990-1991 ANNUAL REPORT 3-3 (1991); Ohio (calendar
year 1991), THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, OHIO COURTS SUMMARY: 1991, at 28B-29B
(199 1); Florida (calendar year 1990), Statistics from the Office of the State Court Administra-
tor, Tallahassee, Florida (1991); Texas (fiscal year 1990-1991), 1991 TEX. JUD. SYS. ANN.
REP., supra note 186, at 16.
189. Data obtained for this chart came from two sources for each state. The first was the
state's official statistical summary. See supra note 188. The second was a Westlaw search,
within the respective state databases, using the following search query: CO(HIGH) &
OP("DEATH PENALTY" OR "CAPITAL PUNISHMENT") & DATE(xx); "xx" in the
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It is not surprising that California, given its size, would have more
capital cases than other states.1 90 As Chart 9, on the next page, illus-
trates, when the number of capital cases is compared to population, Cali-
fornia emerges as a moderate state.191
The picture changes dramatically when noncapital cases decided by
the state high courts are compared. Although California is the most pop-
date restrictor corresponded to the period covered by the state's official court publication. The
cases obtained by this search were then each checked to ascertain whether they were capital
cases, or merely referenced ones. The Westlaw search produced the following results: Califor-
nia (1990-1991), 29 cases; Florida (1991), 93 cases; New Jersey (1990-1991), 12 cases; New
York (1991), none; Ohio (1991), 16 cases; Texas (1990-1991), 17 cases.
190. Texas had the greatest number of executions (41) and Florida the second most (27)
between 1977 (when capital punishment was reinstated) and 1991. Jack Broom, Death-Penalty
Foes Ponder Ways to Get Message Out, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at B3. California did
not have its first post reinstatement execution until 1992. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS, supra note 102, at 955.
191. Population statistics for the six states are for 1990. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS, supra note 102, at 628 (California); id. at 630 (Florida); id. at 640 (New
Jersey); id at 641 (New York); id. at 643 (Ohio); id. at 647 (Texas).
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ulous state, Chart 10, on the following page, shows that its supreme court
decides fewer noncapital cases than any of the others in the survey.
192
Some of the discrepancy is explained by the court structure in other
states. Texas, for example, has a bifurcated high court. Its supreme
court hears only civil cases, while all criminal cases (capital and other)
are heard by the court of criminal appeals.' 93 Justice Stanley Mosk and
others advocate this system for California. 94 Ohio reviews death
192. Data for this chart is taken from the official court summaries published by the respec-
tive states. See supra note 188. In some instances, the number of noncapital cases was derived
by subtracting the number of capital cases from the total number of cases in the reports.
193. See supra notes 185-86.
194. Justice Mosk has been the most vocal proponent of a bifurcated supreme court. See
Stanley Mosk, Opinion: A Two-Part State Supreme Court, I1 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983). As
noted above, within the United States, Texas and Oklahoma have separate high courts for civil
and criminal appeals. Similar systems of divided jurisdiction are also used by Great Britain,
Canada and Australia. See Stem, supra note 113, at 106. France, Germany and Japan appor-
tion their appellate workload among panels of high court judges. Id. at 106-08. This approach
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was authorized for the California Supreme Court prior to the constitutional amendments of
1966, although it was never implemented. Mosk, supra, at 3.
Justice Mosk's proposal was gaining favor in the early 1980s when Rose Bird was chief
justice. Governor George Deukmejian stated he was "seriously considering" the plan because
of the "tremendous backlog of death penalty cases in the calendar." Alan Ashby, Deukmejian
Eyes Proposal to Split State High Court, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 10, 1983, at 1. The idea was not,
however, universally received. For example, state Senator Barry Keene, chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, compared it to President Roosevelt's court-packing plan in 1937. Offi-
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sentences only after intermediate review by that state's court of appeal.195
This relieves the supreme court of some of the burden in capital cases.
New York has no death penalty, so it is not a factor in that court's work-
load. Florida appears to be the anomaly. Not only does its supreme
court handle significantly more capital cases than does California's, it
also decides more than twice as many other cases. The number of death
penalty decisions by the California Supreme Court, as a percentage of all
cases decided, is second only to Florida.1 96
cials at the National Conference on State Courts opposed the plan, as apparently did the
American Bar Association. a; see also Uelmen, supra note 155, at 5 (proposing to direct
attention to flow of cases coming into court and alternatives available for diverting that flow).
A similar proposal for California was made in the 1930s, but was opposed by the Judicial
Council and never adopted. See Ronald H. Beattie, The Proposal to Establish a Court of Crim-
inal Appeals in California, 9 CAL. ST. B.J. 105, 128 (1934).
195. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
196. For the survey years, 23% of the California Supreme Court's case output was com-
prised of capital cases, compared to 30.6% for Florida, 7.9% for New Jersey, 5.4% for Texas,
4.5% for Ohio and zero for New York. These percentages were calculated by dividing the
number of capital cases decided by the sum of capital cases and noncapital cases decided. See
supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
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The differences are even more pronounced when the output of non-
capital cases for the six states are compared to their populations, as illus-
trated in Chart 11, on the preceding page.
197
It may be true that neither the number of cases nor the volume of
important legal issues bears a linear relationship with either a state's gen-
eral population or its population of lawyers. Indeed, one does not expect
to need twice as much law for twice as many people. Yet, the opportu-
nity for legal development would seem greater in more populous states,
and the clamor for justice by individual litigants would seem louder. If
this is a proper measure, then the California Supreme Court trails far
behind its surveyed counterparts.
1 98
This is an area where further study is justified. If courts in sister
states publish more cases, both absolutely and in proportion to popula-
tion, then one might draw conclusions about appellate justice in Califor-
nia. In short, there simply may be too little to go around. Or, to be more
precise, the state supreme court may not participate sufficiently in the
appellate process.199
V. ATrORNEY DISCIPLINE CASES
An examination of the California Supreme Court's treatment of at-
torney discipline cases is useful for two reasons. First, until recently,
disciplinary matters consumed a great amount of supreme court time.2°°
Second, and more importantly, attorney discipline is an area where the
bench and bar have come together to devise a system of adjudication
without making disproportionate demands on judicial resources.
The California Supreme Court began reviewing attorney discipline
matters even before the State Bar of California was established in
1927.201 In that year, the State Bar Act confirmed judicial control over
attorneys.20 2 Of course there were far fewer attorneys and disciplinary
197. See supra notes 188-89 for a description of the research methodology and census data.
198. For a comparison of average judicial output per judge in the state appellate courts, see
Marvell, supra note 76, at 284. It shows that during 1984, justices on the California Supreme
Court and Court of Appeal averaged 109 decisions per year (combined statistics), whereas the
average for judges in the six most productive states was over 150 decisions per year. Id.
199. The California Supreme Court decides only one percent of all state appellate cases; the
remainder terminate in the court of appeal. This is the lowest percentage of any state in the
union. See Marvell, supra note 76, at 286 (1984 comparison of 45 states).
200. See Uelmen, supra note 169, at 34.
201. See Wallace, supra note 103, at 257. The State Bar was created by the State Bar Act.
Act of Mar. 31, 1927, ch. 34, 1927 Cal. Stat. 38 (codified as amended at CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6000 (West 1990)).
202. See Wallace, supra note 103, at 257 nn.41-43. Attorney discipline was handled not
only by the supreme court, but by the court of appeal as well. Id. at 257 n.41.
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matters then. 2°3 As the number of attorneys in the state grew, the disci-
plinary system in California seemed to get out of control. Each disbar-
ment or suspension of a lawyer required supreme court action.204 The
number of attorney discipline cases reached its peak in 1989-1990, when
nearly 500 cases were filed in the supreme court.205
Centralized control over disciplinary matters by a state's highest
court is recommended by the American Bar Association2 "6 and is the
system followed in most states.20 v In California, even though the
supreme court was not required to hear oral argument in each case,20 8 it
did so in ten percent of the cases. This was the highest ratio of hearings
to filings for any category of cases, except for cases where review is
mandatory. In recent years, attorney discipline cases have accounted for
approximately thirty percent of the court's total output.
20 9
Many commentators agree that attorney discipline matters con-
sumed a disproportionate share of judicial resources.210 Centralized re-
view in the supreme court caused significant delays throughout the
system. At one point the backlog of unprosecuted cases reached 5000.211
In January 1987, the legislature ordered a monitor to review the disci-
pline system.212 In his initial report, the monitor stated that the system
was "well below acceptable levels. 21 3 The legislature responded in 1988
by creating the State Bar Court "to act.., in the determination of disci-
203. When the State Bar was organized under the 1927 Act, there were approximately
11,000 attorneys in California. Id. at 252 n.3.
204. Section 6082 of the California Business and Professions Code states:
Any person complained against and any person whose reinstatement the board may
refuse to recommend may have the action of the board, or of any committee author-
ized by it to make a determination on its behalf, pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter, reviewed by the California Supreme Court or by a California Court of Ap-
peal in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the California Supreme Court.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6082 (West 1990); see also id. § 6100 (West 1990) (granting
supreme court power to disbar or suspend in attorney discipline matters).
205. 1991 ANN. RFP., supra note 128, at 7.
206. Wallace, supra note 103, at 258-59.
207. Id. at 256.
208. See id. at 257-58.
209. Uelmen, supra note 169, at 34.
210. See, eg., Gerald F. Uelmen, Losing Steam, CAL. LAW., June 1990, at 33, 42 (quoting
Professor Emeritus Gideon Kanner of Loyola Law School, "wondering why 'sleazy lawyers'
occupy so much of the court's time, while 'worthier' litigants wait in the wings").
211. Katherine Bishop, Moral Turpitude Case vs. Lawyers' Public Image, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
24, 1989, at B5. The State Bar receives approximately 50,000 calls from the public each year,
many of which lead to prosecutions. California Confusion, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 8, 1990, at 12.
212. Professor Robert Fellmeth of the University of San Diego's Center for Public Interest
Law was appointed by then Attorney General John Van de Kamp.
213. See Bishop, supra note 211, at B5.
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plinary and reinstatement proceedings. '214 The new court was staffed by
a coterie of professional judges 215 and funded by a fifty-percent increase
in bar dues for practicing lawyers.216 The State Bar Court began hearing
cases in December 1990.217 The backlog of pending disciplinary matters
was shortly reduced to under 600.218
The jurisdiction of the State Bar Court was enhanced in February,
1991, when Rule 954 was added to the California Rules of Court.219
Rule 954 limits the grounds for review in the supreme court and provides
that denial of review "shall constitute a final judicial determination on
the merits and the recommendation of the State Bar Court shall be filed
as an order of the Supreme Court. '220 The purpose of Rule 954 was to
work "a substantial decrease in the number of cases in which the
Supreme Court must hold hearings and write opinions. ' 221 The figures
demonstrate that it has fulfilled its purpose.
While "[n]othing in this chapter [on the State Bar Court] shall be
construed as limiting or altering the powers of the Supreme Court of this
State to disbar or discipline members of the bar, ' 222 it is clear that the
new court has had a salutary effect on the supreme court's caseload.
Chart 12, on the following page, shows a dramatic dip in the number of
attorney discipline cases filed in the supreme court following creation of
the State Bar Court in 1990.223
214. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.5 (West 1990). There also is an internal appeal from
decisions of the State Bar Court to the Review Department. Id. § 6086.65 (West 1990).
215. See id § 6079.1 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
216. "[Ihe State Bar ... devotes 80 percent of its $44 million annual budget to lawyer
discipline." Harriet Chiang, State Bar Gets Power to Discipline Lawyers, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
26, 1990, at A16.
217. The State Bar Court became effective Dec. 1, 1990, with the adoption of Rule 951 of
the California Rules of Court. CAL. R. Cr. 951.
218. See Greg Lucas, State Bar Clearing Up Complaint Backlog, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 21,
1990, at A4.
219. CAL. R. Cr. 954(b) (authorized by CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6087 (West 1990)).
220. Id In 1988, the legislature also authorized the supreme court to transfer review of
disciplinary matters to the court of appeal. Id. § 6082.
221. Philip Hager, Supreme Court Moves To Ease Caseload, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1990, at
A3. William E. Davis, Director of the Judicial Council of California, has also stated: "The
new rules are expected to save the Supreme Court a substantial amount of time, which it now
will be able to spend on other cases. The rules also recognize the important contributions of
the State Bar Court." William E. Davis, California Council Clarifies Several Points, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 14.
222. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6087 (West 1990).
223. 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 128, at 11.
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In its first year of operation, the State Bar Court decided nine pub-
lished cases. 224 In 1990-1991, the State Bar Court decided thirty-seven
published cases. That period also saw an all-time high of forty-eight de-
cisions published by the supreme court on attorney discipline matters.2 25
Together these two courts seem to have made a substantial dent in
pending disciplinary cases. The effect on the necessity of supreme court
review has been dramatic. In 1991-1992, the State Bar Court
decided nineteen published cases; the supreme court decided only four.
224. Fiscal years are used for this analysis, corresponding to the supreme court's reporting
year. The number of published cases was obtained using the following Westlaw search:
"STATE BAR COURT" AND DATE(AFT 6-30-89) AND DATE(BEF 7-1-90).
225. This was likely due to the number of filings the prior year, 488, which was the highest
number since the Judicial Council began reporting attorney discipline filings.
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Chart 13 shows a significant decline in supreme court attorney discipline
cases.
226
226. Statistics for years 1986-1987 through 1990-1991 were obtained from Dean Uelmen's
published studies in the California Lawyer. See supra note 179. Statistics for 1991-1992 were
obtained from a Westlaw search using the following query: "STATE BAR" AND CO(HIGH)
AND DA(AFT 6-30-91) AND DA(BEF 7-1-92).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has weathered a "100-year flood.""2 7
Each era seems to bring its own cause for concern and controversy. The
current area of discussion is the court's capital jurisdiction. It appears
likely that unless structural changes are made to the court's jurisdiction
or operating procedures, the "crisis in the courts" will continue to
expand.
Many court-watchers have offered solutions to the crush of death
penalty appeals. Some of the most frequent proposals are: (1) treating
capital cases like any other criminal case with appellate jurisdiction in
the court of appeal and discretionary review thereafter in the supreme
court;228 (2) intermediate appellate review of capital verdicts and
sentences by the court of appeal with automatic review thereafter in the
supreme court;229 (3) creating a special court of appeal with appellate
jurisdiction over all capital cases, with or without review thereafter in the
supreme court;23 ° and (4) bifurcating the supreme court into civil and
criminal branches, as was done in Texas and Oklahoma.231
Other proposals have been made to ease the burden of death penalty
cases, 232 and to facilitate the supreme court's work in general. Among
the latter are en banc review by a district court of appeal in the event of
conflicting panel decisions, 233 increasing the court's budget234 and raising
227. Ray Reynolds & Clyde Leland, 'We Have No Hidden Agenda': Chief Justice Malcolm
M, Lucas Sees a More Tranquil Period Ahead, CAL. LAW., June 1987, at 21, 101 (quoting
Chief Justice Lucas).
228. See Weisberg, supra note 148, at 244.
229. Id; see also Kaufman, supra note 22, at 32 (asserting court of appeal review would
simplify supreme court's review of capital cases).
230. This solution was proposed by Bernard Witkin and embodied in Senate Bill 174 of the
1987-1988 Regular Session of the Legislature. See Weisberg, supra note 148, at 244. It is
reminiscent of proposals on the federal level to create a national court of appeal. See generally
id. at 255-56 (discussing and criticizing proposal to create national court of appeal); Paul A.
Freund, A National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1301 (1974) (discussing debate over
and specific benefits of National Court of Appeal).
231. See supra note 185.
232. Professor Weisberg describes some of them as having the common theme of court of
appeal jurisdiction over convictions but not the penalty aspect of cases. The supreme court
would review death sentences only where the conviction is affirmed. See Weisberg, supra note
148, at 245.
233. See Uelmen, supra note 155, at 6.
234. See id. (criticizing court's budget decrease imposed by legislature).
[S]evere budget cuts mean the court will lose support staff [and] ... will certainly
reduce the court's ability to manage its growing caseload.... [Tihe results of sub-
stantial cuts are readily predictable: fewer grants of hearings, more depublication
orders, fewer opinions in civil cases and the same level of death penalty decisions.
And more judicial retirements.
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judicial salaries.2"' More radical reforms have been tried in other juris-
dictions, such as deciding cases without opinion, curtailing oral argu-
ment and using summary judgment procedures.236
In November 1991, Chief Justice Lucas appointed the Commission
on the Future of the Courts, vesting it with "the distinctive mission of
thinking about and helping the courts prepare for a future 30 years from
now." '237 The Commission embarked on a two-year project entitled
"2020 Vision: A Plan for the Future of California's Courts. ' 238 The
Commission has generated a number of suggestions and possible scena-
rios for California courts.23 9
It is difficult to predict whether structural changes in the supreme
court's capital jurisdiction will work any substantive change in death
penalty jurisprudence, in the number of executions or in the frequency of
capital sentences. Some commentators have theorized that unclogging
the appellate route would increase the pace of sentences and executions.
This result might be due to a shorter appellate process or a de-emphasis
on the uniqueness of the penalty. 2' The converse might also be true.
Uelmen, supra note 169, at 36; see also Kaufman, supra note 22, at 32 ("[I]t is wholly unrealis-
tic to expect timely and effective delivery of justice from a court system that does not have
enough judges, courtrooms, staff and equipment.").
235. See Kaufman, supra note 22, at 32 ("Judicial and attorney staff salaries are pitifully
low compared to those paid in the private sector."). Despite its appeal, increased funding of
courts and personnel is not a likely outcome. See Church, supra note 15, at 261.
Politicians allegedly know they do not win elections by spending more money on the
judicial system, or by raising judicial salaries, or by increasing court staff. In times of
financial stringency, politicians spend scarce tax dollars on programs likely to in-
crease their political capital and help them win the next election.
Id.
236. See Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Effectiveness of Measures to Increase
Appellate Court Efficiency and Decision Output, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 415, 416 (1988).
237. Judicial Council Symposium Turns Spotlight on the Future of California Courts, PR
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. The 40-member
commission is charged with four tasks: (1) to identify the "trends that will have an impact on
the courts in the year 2020"; (2) to envision the alternative futures and preferred choices for
the courts; (3) to report on the probable future structure of the courts; and (4) to devise a plan
which will lead California's courts toward the desired choices. Id.
238. Id. Other state courts have embarked on similar projects. Virginia and Arizona have
established commissions to study the future of their courts. Hawaii has held a "Judicial Fore-
sight Congress" sponsored by the Hawaiian State Judiciary and the American Judicature Soci-
ety. Id. The State Justice Institute and the American Judicature Society sponsored a
"Conference on the Future and the Courts" in San Antonio, Texas in 1990. See Martin L.
Haines, Vision and Truth: The National Center Report, N.J. L.J., Aug. 29, 1991, at 17.
239. See, eg., Lawrence B. Solum, Alternative Court Structures in the Future of the Califor-
nia Judiciary, 66 S. CAL. L. Rv. (forthcoming July 1993). Professor Solum describes five
alternative scenarios: the traditional justice system, the privatization of justice, the multi-door
courthouse, the administrative justice system and the community-based model. Id.
240. See Weisberg, supra note 148, at 254.
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For instance, adding intermediate appellate review could lengthen the
time between sentence and execution. The involvement of another layer
of appellate courts could generate new doctrine and grounds for scrutiny
of death sentences.
While some advocates of court reform may be motivated by expecta-
tions of results coinciding with their views on capital punishment, this
does not appear to be a major force among the growing chorus of critics.
Many commentators seem to recognize the salutary effects of reform
quite apart from its ultimate impact on the death penalty itself. To bor-
row Professor Weisberg's term, they are "death-neutral" in their analysis
and criticism of the supreme court's capital jurisdiction. 24 1 That is not to
deny that advocates of reform often press their own special interests and
views of judicial priorities. 42 Yet, there appears to be a remarkable con-
sensus within the profession that systemic changes are long overdue.
It is not the purpose of this Article to advocate any particular mech-
anism of reform. That has been done effectively elsewhere.24 Nor is its
purpose to comment on the death penalty itself, its application or even
the virtue of automatic appeal to the supreme court. Rather, the goal of
this Article is to provide empirical data for further study and debate.
There seems to be a need for that.
241. Professor Weisberg stated: "[N]ot many [critics] advance changes in rates of sentenc-
ing or execution as a benefit-or drawback-of reform. Most act upon an unstated premise
that structural changes will be 'death-neutral.'" Id. But, he sounded a cautionary note in
accepting the premise by stating, "we may be engaged in some academic shadow-boxing." Id.
242. See, eg., Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 146, 189 Cal. Rptr. 696, 710
(1983) (Hanson, I., concurring), vacated 154 Cal. App. 3d 583, 201 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1984)
(depublished, July 12, 1984); Mosk, supra note 194, at 2.
243. See, eg., Weisberg, supra note 148, at 256-66; Kaufman, supra note 22, at 32. More
than 600 articles, books and reports on this topic have been published in recent years. See
generally Marvell, supra note 76.
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